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Abstract
We analyze some voting models mimicking online evaluation systems intended to
reduce the information overload. The minimum number of operations needed for a
system to be effective is analytically estimated. When herding effects are present,
linear preferential attachment marks a transition between trustful and biased rep-
utations.
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1 The General Problem
Electronic communities of all kinds, transaction systems in particular, bring
together users otherwise unknown to each other. In order for expressed opin-
ions to be trusted or for transactions to materialize, rating systems are often
crucial to rely upon [1,2]. They collect information about participants’ past
behavior, aggregate them and display the result. Such systems become most
effective if posted ratings are weighted according to raters’ reputation, the
prototype application of this feedback technique being Epinions.
Previous work [3,4,5] concentrates on optimal reputation systems, assuming
that users pick the object to be judged from a uniform distribution and that
the process converges to the real values, without bothering about the amount
of resources spent. In reality we have to face a limited amount of evaluations
and biased probability distributions of the number of votes.
Here we shall consider a system of N objects endowed with an intrinsic quality
qi, i = 1, 2, ..., N . At each time step t, a user evaluates (or ranks) k objects
drawn from a probability distribution p(t). We shall analyze different situa-
tions of increasing complexity within this framework, trying to find out under
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what circumstances the original values ~q = [q1, q2, ..., qN ] (or their ordering)
can be reconstructed from the aggregation of the evaluations with non zero
probability for N →∞.
2 Random evaluations
In this section we consider the case where objects to be evaluated are chosen
from a uniform distribution pi(t) = 1/N .
Occupancy problem. As a first example we fix k = 1 and ask what is the
minimum number of users t1 needed to evaluate every object at least once
with a given probability P > 0. The probability that after t steps all objects
have been evaluated reads [6]:
P (t, N) =
N∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
N
j
)(
1−
j
N
)t
∼
t,N→∞
e−λ,
where λ ≃ Ne−
t
N is the expected number of unjudged objects. The above
limit becomes greater than zero as soon as the number of evaluators t reaches
the value
t1 ≃ N log
N
λ
. (1)
Pairwise comparisons. Let us now fix k = 2 and assume that players can
just compare (not rate) one randomly chosen couple at each step. We call
ri the i
th ranked agent according to her intrinsic value qi. If raters make no
mistakes, the real rank is recovered once the N−1 paired comparisons GN−1 =
[(r1, r2), (r2, r3), ..., (rN−1, rN)] have been performed. The probability to pick
an element belonging to GN−1 is 2/N , and from (1) one needs doing so at least
N logN times. The minimal number of steps needed to find ~r = [r1, r2, ..., rN ]
with finite probability is then
tc2 ≃ N
2 log(cN), (2)
where c is a constant depending on P .
We should remark here that random comparisons are not at all a good so-
lution for sorting a vector of scalars: finding optimal sorting algorithms is a
classic problem of computer science [7]. In real situations, though, one does
not always have control over the evaluators’ choice. Besides, evaluators make
mistakes and the outcome of a comparison is often uncertain. In this case a
common procedure is to perform round robins with successive eliminations,
obtaining equation (2) for the minimum number of comparisons needed to find
the winner [8].
2
Ranking a group of peers. Let us now consider a self evaluating community,
a group of N users sharing the same expertise and voting for one another. This
is equivalent to fixing t = N in our general model. The N agents pick each k
randomly chosen peers, and establish a partial ranking among them according
to their intrinsic values. We want to find, in the limit of large N , the minimal
average value kr of k that allows to recover the “God-given” ordering with
probability P .
When k ≪ N this model can be mapped into the previous one. In fact making
a local ordering of k elements would require about k2 paired comparisons. We
then need Nk2r ∼ N
2 logN comparisons to find the entire ranking. Thus
kr ≃
√
N log(cN). (3)
In figure 1 this last result is shown to match well simulation data.
Fig. 1. Minimal average number of comparisons per agent kr needed to achieve the
correct rank with probability P = 0.7 as a function of N . Circles are simulation
results averaged over 100 realizations, the solid line is the analytical estimation (3).
3
3 Preferential attachment
In real electronic communities fame plays an important role. Objects that
are already popular are more likely to receive comments, books mentioned by
important media are more likely to be reviewed, people about whom many
talk about are more likely to be judged again, and so on. Such “richer get
richer” phenomenon, often referred to as preferential attachment [9], appears
in numerous empirical data of social systems [10] and is thought to be one
of the factors responsible for the emergence of scale free networks. A direct
consequence of this mechanism is that attendance is not a fair indicator of
web pages’ quality [11].
Reputation systems collect evaluations about objects, aggregate and release
them. The aggregation process often consists in computing an average of the
received votes for each object. Assuming that objects have an intrinsic quality
qi and that evaluations are random variables with mean equal to qi, the law
of large numbers ensures that computed reputations tend to the real intrinsic
values once the number of users becomes large. The implicit assumption is that
every object receives a growing number of evaluations, which is not always the
case in the presence of some sort of preferential attachment.
This can be verified within the framework of the occupancy problem of section
2: a user per time step t evaluates k = 1 objects among theN available. Instead
of drawing the objects to be evaluated from a uniform distribution, let us now
define
pi(t) =
vαi (t)
N∑
j=1
vαj (t)
, (4)
where vi(t) is the number of evaluations received by object i up to time t, with
vi(0) = 1∀i. The parameter α sets the strength of the preferential attachment.
In the limit α → ∞ one has pi(t) → δ(i − i
∗), where i∗ = argmaxi{vi(t)}); if
α = 0, on the other hand, pi becomes uniform.
As the real rank is not reached with certainty, it is useful to define a distance
on the rank space. Let
d(r[1], r[2]) =
1− c(r[1], r[2])
2
(5)
be the distance between two ranks, where
c(r[1], r[2]) =
∑N
i=1 ri[1]ri[2]√∑N
i=1 r
2
i [1]
∑N
i=1 r
2
i [2]
is the rank correlation coefficient [12].
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Fig. 2. Time dependence of the distance (5) between the “God given rank” rG and
the rank r produced by the model with preferential attachment (4). Symbols report,
in log-linear scale, results of a simulation with N = 500 agents and α = 2 (circles),
α = 1 (plus signs) and α = 0 (diamonds).
In fig.2 the time dependence of the distance between the “God given rank”
and the best guess r, as defined in (5), is reported. Numerical simulations show
that for α > 1 the distance reaches a plateau > 0, meaning that one can never
achieve an arbitrary good estimate of qualities ~q because some agents never
get to be evaluated. For α < 1, on the other hand, the real rank is recovered
in a finite number of time steps; at the transition point α = 1 one needs an
infinite amount of steps to evaluate all objects.
In fact we can explain such a behavior with the following argument. The
transition appears when the number of visits vi(t) does not grow in time for
some is. For most objects the number of visits still grows linearly in time
vi(t) ≃ fit (6)
close to the transition. We can thus approximate the denominator of (4)
N∑
j=1
vαj (t) ≃ Nt
αI(α), where I(α) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
fαi . The probability for a given object
i never to receive an evaluation up to time t is Qi(t) =
t∏
t′=0
(1− pi(t
′)), the log
5
of which, log(Qi) ≃ −
1
NI(α)
t∑
s=1
1
sα
, only converges to a finite value for α ≥ 1:
the transition value is indeed α = 1.
One can generalize the preferential attachment rule (4) by introducing multi-
plicative intrinsic qualities: high quality agents have more chance to be evalu-
ated, similarly to the model proposed in ref. [13]. Let us define the probability
to be evaluated as follows:
pi(t) =
qiv
α
i (t)
N∑
j=1
qjvαj (t)
, (7)
We can again approximate the denominator of (7) as
N∑
j=1
qjv
α
j (t) ≃ Nt
αI(α),
where I(α) =
+∞∫
−∞
ρ(q)qfα(q)dq and ρ is the probability distribution of the
quality vector q. The same transition at α = 1 is found and equation (6)
yields
fi=
(
qi
NI(α)
)γ
(8)
γ=
1
1− α
. (9)
Numerical simulations are shown to agree with this approximation in figure
3. The left panel displays the q dependence of f for fixed α: equation (8)
asymptotically matches the simulation data. In the right panel of figure 3
the ratio γ between the logarithm of the rate of visits vi/t and that of the
intrinsic quality qi is plotted against α. Equation (9) fits the data for α < αc
and diverges at α = 1 as expected. The simulations were carried on with a
uniform ρ(q).
The distribution of the number of visits becomes a power law around the
transition point α = 1, as reported in figure 4.
The results described in this section can be easily extended to the case of
pairwise comparisons introduced in section 2. That is, agents compare 2 ob-
jects per time step, chosen according to equation (7), and rank them in order
of decreasing quality. The global ranking is finally established on the basis of
these partial orderings. The question is to find the maximal value of α that
allows to recover the true rank with finite probability. This can be done by
evaluating the probability that two agents (belonging to the set GN−1) will
never be compared. By very similar reasoning to the absolute judgment case,
one obtains αc =
1
2
.
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Fig. 3. (Left graph) Average rate of visits f to an agent plotted against her intrinsic
quality q, after 105 time steps, with α = 0.5. (Right graph) Ratio γ between the
logarithm of the rate of visits vi/t and that of the intrinsic quality qi plotted against
α. Circles are simulation data, lines are calculated with equation 8. Other simulatin
parameters: number of agents N = 500, number of realizations= 10. Qualities are
uniformly distributed.
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